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Sammendrag:. Arbeidsnotatet diskuterer de 
strategiene miljøvernorganisasjonene har valgt i sine 
forsøk på å påvirke norske myndigheters adferd i 
forhandlingene under FNs klimakonvensjon 
(UNFCCC). Studien omfatter både norske 
miljøvernorganisasjoner og deres internasjonale 
allierte i paraplyorganisasjonen Climate Action 
Network (CAN), og fokuserer på deres aktiviteter 
under de viktigste forhandlingsmøtene. 
Organisasjonene valgte hovedsaklig ikke å forsøke 
å virke inn på forhandlingsutfallet ved å påvirke 
forhandlerne direkte (lobbyvirksomhet). I stedet 
brukte de forhandlingsmøtene som anledning til å 
forme den hjemlige politiske dagsordenen ved å levere 
informasjon og argumenter til mediene. Hensikten var 
å øve indirekte innflytelse over Norges 
utenrikspolitikk og forhandlingsposisjon ved å legge 
moralsk press på myndighetene ("shaming") og å 
legge premisser for den hjemlige debatten som var 
fordelaktige for organisasjonenes politikk ("framing"). 
Handlinger på de hjemlige og de internasjonale 
politiske arenaene var i dette tilfellet nært forbundet. 
Vi mener slike forbindelser bør tas i betraktning når 
man vurderer miljøorganisasjonenes eventuelle 
innflytelse i internasjonale forhandlinger. Mer 
spesifikt peker vi på to potensielt viktige kilder til 
innflytelse over utenrikspolitikk og dermed 
forhandlingsutfall: for det første organisasjonenes 
evne til å true en regjerings anseelse og omdømme. 
For det andre deres evne til å forme hjemlige aktørers 
oppfatning av internasjonale forpliktelser. 
   
Abstract: This paper discusses the strategies chosen 
by Norwegian-based environmental non-governmental 
organizations(ENGOs) and their international allies in 
the Climate Action Network (CAN) in seeking to 
influence Norway’s behaviour in the UN climate 
change negotiations. We focus on ENGO activities at 
the major negotiating sessions and find that the 
ENGOs for the most part chose not to try to affect 
negotiation outcomes through influencing the 
negotiators directly (i.e., lobbying). Instead, they used 
the negotiating sessions as opportunities to shape the 
domestic political agenda by transmitting information 
and arguments to the media. The aim was to indirectly 
influence Norway’s foreign policy and negotiating 
position by shaming its government into adopting 
policies preferred by the ENGOs, and framing the 
domestic climate policy debate in terms favourable to 
the NGO’s policies. We show how actions taken in the 
international and domestic political arenas were 
closely intertwined in this case, and argue that ENGO 
influence in international negotiations should be 
understood with such linkages taken into account. 
Specifically, we emphasise that the ENGOs’ability to 
threaten a government’s legitimacy and popular 
image, as well as their ability to shape domestic 
actor’s interpretations of international commitments, 
should be noted as potentially important vehicles of 
influence over foreign policy and thereby over 
negotiation  outcomes. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, environmental NGOs (ENGOs) have sought to make governments in 
Europe and the rest of the industrialised world commit to and implement substantial and early 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. One of several political arenas where they have 
worked to promote this goal is the international negotiations under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
The aim of this chapter is to throw light on the strategies ENGOs employ in seeking to 
influence international negotiations and foreign policy. To illustrate the discussion, we 
specifically examine how ENGOs attempted to influence Norway in the UNFCCC 
negotiations from 1995 to 2001. We look at the activities of Norwegian ENGOs as well as 
their international counterparts in the international ENGO coalition Climate Action Network 
(CAN) during the main negotiating sessions. Not surprisingly, Norway’s behaviour was the 
main concern for the Norwegian groups, while multinational ENGOs such as Greenpeace 
International or WWF International gave attention to Norway more sporadically. 
Our focus on strategy choice says little by itself about the environmental groups’ actual 
results in terms of influence over outcomes (Betsill and Corell 2001). The NGOs’ strategies 
could simply be a failure, and their actions irrelevant to outcomes. However, careful attention 
to the strategies actually chosen may help us identify potentially important forms and 
channels of influence. Specifically, we point out that even when attending the UN 
conferences, ENGOs spent much of their energy seeking to influence domestic debates and 
decisions on foreign policy – the government’s negotiating position, as well as the 
interpretation and implementation of existing commitments – rather than trying to influence 
negotiators directly. Observers who assume that NGO influence over the outcome of 
international negotiations results only from direct lobbying at the international conferences 
could easily overlook the impact of the more indirect strategies we discuss here.  
In the following section we start by showing how international relations and social 
movement scholars understand the role of NGOs in international negotiations and foreign 
policy, introducing some concepts useful for understanding the presentation of the case. The 
next section provides background on Norway’s role in international climate policy and the 
NGOs in question. The main section then presents and discusses the NGOs’ strategy choices 
at the international conferences. In concluding, we confront our findings with some 
assumptions frequently made in analyses of the influence of NGOs in international 
negotiations. 
2 Background: NGOs, foreign policy, and international 
environmental negotiations 
Thousands of individuals attend the main negotiating sessions under the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (“COP” for short) that take place more or less annually. Official 
representatives of the states that are parties to the Convention and are thereby eligible to vote 
have frequently been outnumbered by registered observers who are there to gather 
information or seek some form of influence or attention. A majority of the observers represent 
NGOs, particularly environmental groups and business associations. Most of them are trying 
to influence the outcome of negotiations through one means or another.  
In the literature on international environmental politics, much attention has recently been 
directed at the role of such NGOs. Opinions about the scope and degree of their influence are 
widely diverging. This chapter seeks to illuminate one aspect of this discussion, namely the 
various strategies non-state actors use to influence the outcome of ongoing negotiations.  
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While representatives of sovereign states hold a monopoly on formal decision-making 
power at international negotiations, it is increasingly recognized that other actors still may 
play crucial roles in facilitating and shaping international environmental cooperation. 
Particularly when it comes to bringing attention to issues and thereby shaping the political 
agenda, the role of NGOs is widely recognized. The forms and degree of NGO influence 
during the actual negotiations are, however, currently subject to considerable debate and 
research by students of foreign policy and international relations. 
A recently proposed framework for analysis of NGO influence in international negotiations 
assumes from the outset that “tactics such as the granting of rewards or the threat of 
punishment (...) generally are not viable options during a UN negotiation on an environmental 
issue”, and that information therefore is “the key currency for NGOs in exerting influence” 
(Betsill and Corell 2001). Indeed, NGO influence is defined as occurring “when [NGOs] 
intentionally transmit information to negotiators that alters both the negotiating process and 
outcome from what would have occurred otherwise” (Betsill and Corell 2001). According to 
these authors, NGO influence is thus present when NGOs participate actively during the 
negotiations and have access to negotiators and the information or knowledge resources to 
make them listen – as well as when the information they provide can also be seen to have 
altered or shaped outcomes such as treaty texts.  
The framework proposed by Betsill and Corell explicitly seeks to embrace both 
international and nationally-based NGOs, but is exclusively concerned with events on the 
political arena provided by international negotiations. Following the conventional distinction 
between international and sub-national levels of decision making, any influence NGOs might 
have over decisions regarding the relevant domestic and foreign policies of national 
governments is excluded from the analysis. 
In contrast to this approach, we will in the following discussion stress the 
interconnectedness of political processes at the international and national levels regarding 
policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions. In taking this perspective, we follow authors such 
as Skodvin and Andresen (Skodvin and Andresen 2003), who entertain a broader 
understanding of NGO influence on negotiations, including influence through domestic 
politics. In other words, what Barkdull and Harris call societal theories of environmental 
foreign policy is a necessary supplement to theories focusing on the international system 
(Barkdull and Harris 2002). This also invites consideration of a broader set of means of 
influence than merely providing information. The case we present below provides support for 
the usefulness of this approach. 
In Barkdull and Harris’ typology of foreign policy theories, we find that society-oriented 
approaches stressing the role of interests and ideas are particularly helpful in throwing light 
on the strategies employed by ENGOs seeking to influence Norway (Barkdull and Harris 
2002). Specifically, a few concepts borrowed from the literature on international regimes and 
negotiations, and from the literature on social movements, prove useful in understanding 
domestic–international linkages in this case. Students of international regimes have observed 
that the shaming activities of NGOs can strengthen regimes. “Shaming” refers to an activity 
that “exploits the symbolic legitimacy of foreign pressure and international institutions to 
unleash domestic moral opprobrium” (Moravcsik 1995). By pointing to controversial 
government practices, international norms that condemn such practices, or international 
reactions to the practices in question, shaming strategies are intended to induce changes in 
government policy. Such strategies are frequently pursued by NGOs to put pressure on 
governments to keep agreements or to modify controversial domestic policies (Rengger 
1997). Shaming activities could equally well be directed at positions taken in international 
negotiations, as will be illustrated below.  
Students of social movements have also stressed the importance of framing activities – the 
interpretive work that activists do in presenting issues to the public and decision makers. The 
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framing that NGOs give their issues could simply reflect unconscious or taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the issues at stake. In many cases, however, activists use strategic framing 
as a tool to further their political or organizational goals (Zald 1996). When policy is made in 
a multi-level process, the interpretation of events at the international level of action becomes a 
key part of the efforts of NGOs to strategically frame the domestic debate. 
A two-level game has been suggested as a metaphor for political processes where 
participants in intergovernmental negotiations also engage in negotiations with key sub-
national actors at home regarding foreign policy. Analytically, one can distinguish between a 
negotiation phase where governments bargain at the international level, and a ratification 
phase where ratification (and thereafter implementation) of the outcome of the negotiations at 
the international level is considered and contested within each country. In practice, 
expectations about events at one level influence strategies at the other level (Putnam 1988).  
Expanding on Putnam’s perspective in the context of social movement studies, della Porta 
and Kriesi observe that non-governmental actors do not limit themselves to mobilisation at 
the domestic level. They offer a typology of social movement activities beyond the nation-
state (della Porta and Kriesi 1998). Through transnational mobilisation, a national movement 
facing a difficult situation domestically could seek alliance with movements in other countries 
that will either support the movement or direct international pressure at the government of the 
country in question. Cross-level mobilisation refers to cooperation between a national 
movement and a foreign government. Finally, international levels of the political system 
represented by institutions such as the EU and the UN offer new political arenas for national 
movements, as well as opportunities and incentives to establish genuinely transnational 
mobilising structures that are often oriented towards influencing decision-making at the 
international level. 
3 Norway, the Kyoto Protocol and the ENGOs 
Compared to the situation in the United States, Russia and many developed countries, the 
Norwegian climate policy debate has been characterized by a relatively high degree of 
consensus that climate change is a real threat worth addressing through mitigation policies. At 
the same time, Norway’s reliance on petroleum and other emissions-intensive industries for 
export income, as well as on road traffic for keeping a large but sparsely populated country 
connected, makes policy instruments such as environmental taxes or tradable quotas 
controversial.  
During the 1990s, much of the climate policy debate in Norway – both regarding domestic 
policies and the Norwegian position in the UNFCCC negotiations – centred on the 
relationship between international cooperation and national action to limit emissions. Should 
the Norwegian government take ambitious measures to reduce domestic emissions regardless 
of what other countries did, or should such action be conditional upon international 
agreements? Was it crucial to reduce emissions domestically, or was financing of cheaper 
emissions reductions abroad through “flexibility mechanisms” (after 1997 also known as 
“Kyoto mechanisms”), such as international emissions trading or project-based cooperation, 
of equal value? The environmental movement favoured early action at home over 
conditionality and flexible international solutions (Kasa, Malvik et al. 2001; Hovden and 
Lindseth 2002). This position taken by the Norwegian ENGOs mirrored the views of their 
international counterparts, which stressed each country’s responsibility to start reducing its 
own emissions without delay, and viewed “flexible” solutions with varying degrees of 
suspicion. 
Our analysis in the following sections focuses on the years 1995-2001. Events in this period 
should, however, be understood in light of the earlier climate policy debates since the second 
half of the 1980s. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development 
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(WCED) headed by Norwegian Prime Minister at the time, Gro Harlem Brundtland, had 
presented its report Our Common Future (WCED 1987). Here, the question of human-
induced climate change was highlighted as one of the main challenges facing the world. The 
report contributed strongly to attracting political attention to the issue internationally and even 
more so in Norway. Brundtland’s prominent role in international environmental affairs made 
her government especially sensitive to embarrassment regarding its own environmental 
conduct. This sensitivity was eagerly exploited by the environmental movement.  
An early example was seen in 1989, when activists from Natur og Ungdom (Nature and 
Youth – NU – a membership-based ENGO for people younger than 25 years old) got hold of 
a draft plan for the Brundtland government’s work with the issues raised in Our Common 
Future. The draft suggested far less restrictive limits for national CO2 emissions than the 
environmentalists wanted. NU activists took the draft to an international environmental 
conference in The Hague. Their “goal was to draw international attention” to the 
unsatisfactory action taken by Brundtland’s own government on the issues raised by the 
Brundtland Commission (Persen and Ranum 1997). They received attention in Dutch and 
Danish newspapers. Several international NGOs signed petitions demanding stronger 
environmental policies from Norway and expressing disappointment with Brundtland. This 
international attention in turn led to publicity on the issue in the Norwegian news media – and 
a prolonged, heated argument between the Prime Minister’s office and NU (Persen and 
Ranum 1997; Nilsen 2001). The affair placed the question of a national CO2 target firmly on 
the political agenda, where environmental issues were already getting increasing attention. In 
the pro-environmental political climate at the time, a broad majority in Parliament soon 
passed a stricter CO2 target than that proposed by the Brundtland government, namely to 
stabilise emissions at the 1989 level by 2000 (Nilsen 2001; Reitan 2001).  
  About the same time, negotiations concerning a global regime to limit human 
contributions to climate change began. This process led to the adoption of the UNFCCC at the 
UN “Earth Summit” in 1992 (an event which again pitted Brundtland against domestic 
environmental groups). The Climate Convention set a non-binding target of stabilising 
emissions from industrialised countries at 1990 levels by 2000. In Norway a CO2 tax was 
imposed on emissions from road transport, offshore oil and gas extraction and several other 
sectors, while export industries to a large degree were exempted.  
During the first years of the 1990s, it gradually became clear that Norway would have a 
hard time fulfilling its national stabilisation target. Especially unforeseen growth in oil and 
natural gas output from fields in the North Sea led to increases in expected emissions growth. 
A controversy in 1990–1991 concerning industrial use of natural gas, the so-called Heidrun 
project, stemmed from the conflict between reaching the CO2 target on one hand and 
industrial development on the other. The environmental movement and its political allies 
successfully opposed plans for a gas-fired power plant with considerable CO2 emissions. 
During the summer of 1994, new plans for gas-fired power in Norway were launched. The 
company Naturkraft was established to develop and run two power plants on the western 
coast of Norway. The owners were the petroleum company Statoil, power company Statkraft 
(both owned by the Norwegian state) and partially state-owned Norsk Hydro. 
The period in focus here (1995–2001) started with several important developments. In 
spring 1995 the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) of the Climate Convention was 
convened in Berlin, and issued a mandate (“the Berlin Mandate”) to negotiate a treaty with 
legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in industrialised countries. 
In June that year, the Labour Government led by Gro Harlem Brundtland officially 
announced – in a long-awaited action plan on climate policy – that the stabilisation target was 
unattainable and therefore in practice abandoned. During the same year, FIVH (The Future in 
Our Hands), GPN (Greenpeace Norway), NNV (Norwegian Society for the Conservation of 
Nature) and NU joined forces under the umbrella Klimakameratene (“Climate Friends”). This 
alliance produced joint hearing documents criticising the government’s action plan and 
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negotiating position, and lobbied and campaigned both jointly and individually against the 
two gas-fired power plants planned by Naturkraft that would increase domestic CO2 
emissions by about 5 percent.  
During the winter 1995–1996, the gas-power issue was singled out by the Norwegian 
environmental movement as a main target for protest in order to raise awareness and political 
pressure around the broader question of rising domestic CO2 emissions and Norway’s 
contribution to global climate change before the Kyoto conference (Hesstvedt 2001; Nilsen 
2001:221). The decision of whether or not build the two projected power plants was soon 
declared “the most important environmental issue of the 1990s” (Engeland 1996a). The 
movement’s framing of a single industrial project as the symbol for the whole global warming 
issue was a conscious choice that enabled activists to mobilise broadly around a problem that 
could otherwise have seemed too abstract and distant. This was recognized as a strategic 
choice not only by movement leaders, but also by activists at the grassroots level (Carlsson 
and Tjernshaugen 2000:36). It allowed the complex, abstract and distant climate problem to 
be focused into an issue sufficiently tangible, close-to-home and simple to facilitate broad 
mobilization and crystallise political alliances and lines of conflict. This was clearly a case of 
strategic framing (Zald 1996). 
In April 1996, Klima-alliansen (“the Climate Alliance”), a broader alliance against the 
Naturkraft project that included several opposition parties as well as the youth branches of the 
major pro-gas Labour and Conservative parties, was established. In May it presented its 
counter-report to the Government’s white paper on gas-fired power. In June a clear majority 
in Parliament approved of the project subject to certain conditions to be considered by the 
government. At the COP2 meeting in Geneva, also in June, a surprise announcement by the 
American delegation that the US supported binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions 
added new momentum to the negotiations. In September Klima-alliansen announced a 
campaign to collect 100,000 signatures on a petition demanding that the authorities reconsider 
the project; the signatures were submitted in December. 
During 1997, intense negotiations took place before the COP3 meeting in Kyoto, which 
was to finalise a treaty with binding emission targets. In January that year the NU congress 
announced its intention to use civil disobedience against the Naturkraft project if necessary. 
The ad-hoc Fellesaksjonen mot gasskraftverk (“Joint action against gas-fired power plants,” 
FMG) was established on an individual membership basis to organise protests in the event of 
any construction work, which was expected to start any moment. But in May 1997, Prime 
Minister Thorbjørn Jagland (Labour) made statements that in effect postponed the project 
until after the parliamentary elections and the Kyoto conference, both of which were to take 
place during fall that year.  
After the elections, a minority coalition of three centrist parties that were all against the 
Naturkraft project and members of Klima-alliansen took over the government offices. The 
majority in parliament still supported the project. At COP3 in December, Norway was 
therefore represented by Minister of the Environment Guro Fjellanger (Liberal), who opposed 
the Naturkraft project but otherwise disappointed the activists.  
The Kyoto Protocol was finalised as planned, and set a target of maximum one percent 
increase in total Norwegian emissions of six greenhouse gases compared to 1990 within the 
period 2008–2012. But crucial rules regarding implementation of the protocol were left open 
for later meetings. This also meant that the prospects for gas-fired power in Norway were not 
definitely settled by the outcome of the negotiations. An announcement during spring 1998 by 
Norsk Hydro, one of the Naturkraft partners, that it would give priority to developing its own 
technology for gas-fired power with reduced CO2 emissions represented a major setback, and 
low producer prices on electric power kept delaying the project. Environmental activists tried 
to keep the threat of massive mobilisation alive during the next years, while the formalities 
regarding Naturkraft’s permission to build power plants and to emit CO2 and NOx was again 
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haggled over by various government agencies after complaints from environmental groups. 
During the same period, several new gas-fired power projects were proposed by other 
commercial actors. In March 2000, the centrist coalition Government resigned on grounds of 
being instructed by Parliament regarding the use of environmental legislation in this matter. 
Although Norwegian authorities have since granted the necessary permissions for the planned 
gas-fired power plants, the plants have not yet been built.  The activities of Norwegian 
ENGOs clearly delayed the building of the Naturkraft project, in conjunction with economic 
factors. This issue constituted a major part of the Norwegian ENGOs’ climate policy agenda 
in the years 1995-2001. 
After President Bush’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, Norway joined 
the EU and others in seeking to save the Protocol. At the seventh Conference of the Parties to 
the Climate Convention (COP7) in Marrakech in late 2001, Norway supported a compromise 
proposed by the EU and the developing country group G77 and China. Norway explicitly 
opposed demands from Japan, Russia, Canada, and Australia for easing the rules on several 
accounts, including how to include “forest sinks” in emissions budgets. This stance with 
respect to fellow members of the so-called Umbrella Group (an alliance of non-EU 
industrialised countries which also includes the US) gave the Norwegian government a 
somewhat improved standing with the ENGOs. In 2002, the Norwegian Government ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol, which has not yet entered into force. 
3.1 The organisations 
International as well as nationally based ENGOs cooperating under the umbrella of the 
Climate Action Network (CAN) are a well integrated part of the community of officials, 
experts and lobbyists that gather regularly at UNFCCC negotiating meetings (Walk and 
Brunnengräber 2000; Gough and Shackley 2001). Below, we describe and discuss the 
political strategies used by CAN members – both nationally-based groups and their 
international allies – in seeking to influence one national government’s behaviour.  
The four Norwegian ENGOs that participated actively in the CAN network during the 
relevant period were  
 
• Framtiden i Våre Hender (“The Future in Our Hands” - FIVH), 
• Greenpeace Norway (GPN),  
• Naturvernforbundet (NNV, Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature; since 
the early 1990s the Norwegian branch of Friends of the Earth International, FoEI), 
and   
• Natur og Ungdom (NU, Nature and Youth, an independent youth branch of NNV, 
also affiliated with FoEI).  
 
Representatives of these four groups followed the international negotiations as observers, 
and established formalised cooperation among themselves on domestic climate change policy 
from 1995. NNV, NU and FIVH are membership-based organisations with local branches and 
an internal democratic structure. They all receive considerable funding from the Norwegian 
government. Greenpeace Norway was the Norwegian branch of Greenpeace International 
until 1998, when the Nordic branches of the organisation were joined in a common Nordic 
organisation. Greenpeace has had remarkably little success in establishing a foothold in 
Norway, with a few hundred members compared to more than 70 000 in neighbouring 
Sweden (Bortne, Grendstad et al. 2001). In the climate change issue, however, Greenpeace 
Norway played an important role as a representative of the international environmental 
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movement in the national debate. Generally, only a handful of representatives from the 
Norwegian ENGO’s headquarters participated at the COPs. An exception to this rule was the 
COP1 meeting in Berlin, where a busload of NU activists participated in an alternative 
conference and demonstrated against the Norwegian Minister of the Environment (Carlsson 
and Tjernshaugen 2000; Walk and Brunnengräber 2000).  
All the four Klimakameratene organisations participated in CAN, a broad network of 
environmental NGOs primarily active in and around the negotiation process (Walk and 
Brunnengräber 2000). The network also includes key lobbyists from big international groups 
who are intensely involved in the negotiations down to the level of technical details. The most 
visible multinational CAN members were 
• Greenpeace International 
• Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) 
• WWF International 
CAN members at the COPs even included well as some activists from other countries than 
Norway taking part in their country’s official delegations.  
The daily CAN meetings that took place during COP meetings have been a crucial source 
of information for the Norwegian activists. In addition, NNV and NU are members of FoE 
International. Perhaps more important was the linkage between Greenpeace Norway and 
Greenpeace International. Kalle Hesstvedt, the leader of the Norwegian branch’s climate 
work during much of the 1990s, had worked in Greenpeace International for some time. For 
the rest of the organisations, the Norwegian climate change activists never delved deeply into 
the world of international negotiations, and did not occupy central roles in the CAN or FoEI 
networks. 
The Norwegian environmental movement has traditionally been strongly oriented towards 
national institutions in its political strategies (Gundersen 1991; Seippel 1999). A recent study 
based on survey data concludes that Norwegian environmentalism – manifested both in the 
views and strategies of environmental movement organisations and in popular attitudes – is a 
unique case (Bortne, Grendstad et al. 2001). One defining trait is the inclusive political 
system shared by Scandinavian countries, which goes along with a “state-friendly” society 
where NGOs can cooperate closely with the state and receive public funding without losing 
their credibility as critics of public policy, and where citizens have high levels of trust in 
government institutions, but where the state also tends to co-opt new social movements. The 
other characteristic trait is a cultural orientation toward local, rural communities, which goes 
along with a pragmatic, use-oriented view of nature with little room for issues such as animal 
rights within the domestic environmental movement. Bortne et.al. claim that not only is this 
combination unique, but that it also explains why attempts to establish a viable Greenpeace 
branch or Green party in Norway have been unsuccessful. 
They also stress that the “state-friendliness” of Norwegian society makes it difficult for a 
movement or an organisation to grow while keeping its distance from the state (Bortne, 
Grendstad et al. 2001). Norwegian climate change activism has certainly been shaped by state 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the movement and its activities: The Ministry of the 
Environment financed the participation of leading activists as observers at the COP meetings, 
and the police had advance meetings with activists planning civil disobedience against the 
building of new, gas-fired power plants, in order to exchange information and build mutual 
trust. It would, however, be mistaken to assume that there was a confluence of views on 
climate policy between the Norwegian Government and the environmental movement, as 
Kellow has observed for certain European countries (Kellow 2000). Rather, the views on such 
crucial questions as CO2 taxes and rules for burden-sharing between countries and 
implementation of commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have tended to diverge strongly. In 
championing strict regulation of domestic CO2 emissions both through international treaties 
 
 
7
CICERO Working Paper 2004:09  
Norwegian NGOs in the Climate Change Negotiations 
 
 
and national legislation, the Norwegian environmental movement has met massive resistance 
from energy-intensive industries with strong ties to state bodies and the political 
establishment, especially in the Labour and Conservative parties (Kasa 2000; Nilsen 2001). 
The Norwegian delegations to the climate change negotiations have not included NGO 
representatives, as several other national negotiations have done (Walk and Brunnengräber 
2000). This may relate to the fact that Norway’s roles as major oil exporter and as self-
proclaimed environmental leader since the 1970s are hard to reconcile in the climate change 
arena, and that the domestic environmental movement is certainly not making it any easier for 
the government.  
In the following section we move on to an analysis of the strategy choices of the ENGOs. 
The work of two important Norwegian ENGOs – WWF Norway and the Bellona Foundation 
– will not be discussed here. WWF International is also a part of CAN, and has an active 
Norwegian branch. WWF Norway, however, did not engage actively in the international 
climate policy process during the time period in question. The Oslo-based Bellona Foundation 
did attend some of the meetings in question and were active in the domestic climate policy 
debate, but was not part of the international or other joint ENGO initiatives discussed here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN Climate Change Negotiations
NGOs Negotiations Outcomes
Domestic
Public Politics
 
Figure 1: Channels of NGO influence in international negotiations. NGO 
activists may seek to influence negotiation outcomes either through influencing 
diplomats during the negotiations (lobbying) or by using appeals to the domestic 
public through the news media (the “shaming” and “framing” strategies described 
below) to influence government officials responsive to public attitudes and 
perceptions. 
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4 Strategy choice 
We now turn to the strategies chosen by the ENGOs seeking to influence Norway’s behaviour 
in the climate change negotiations. Their efforts may be categorized under three headings: 
Lobbying (which in fact formed a minor part of their efforts), shaming, and framing (see 
figure 1). 
4.1 Lobbying 
ENGO representatives clearly had ideas about what they wanted the Norwegian negotiators to 
do, but in fact they rarely spent much energy during the meetings trying to influence them. 
Mostly the Norwegian NGOs used the formal briefings with the Norwegian delegation (which 
were open to NGOs representing business, environmental and scientific interests in Norway 
that were present at the COP meetings) and even their more informal contacts with members 
of the delegation at and around the conference venue, mainly to gather information. A simple 
reason for this was that the government and the ENGOs were usually well aware of each 
other’s points of view long before the COP took place. The ENGOs usually prepared and 
published lists of demands and proposals to the Norwegian delegation well ahead of the 
conferences, and attended advance briefings by the Ministry of the Environment in Oslo. At 
any rate, based on earlier experience, the ENGOs usually considered their opportunities for 
exercising direct influence to be very limited.  
There are exceptions. At the Kyoto conference, ENGO representatives tried intensely but 
unsuccessfully to lobby the Liberal environment minister Guro Fjellanger, who had once been 
employed by NNV, and who had previously expressed opinions closer to the ENGO’s 
positions than the official Norwegian line.  
If lobbying the Norwegian delegation was not the key preoccupation of the activists, 
neither was influencing other delegations or the overall agenda of the COPs. The Norwegians 
usually attended the CAN meetings and took part in discussions on common strategy. 
However as will be elaborated on below, even here they were to a large degree seeking 
support in their domestic struggles rather than trying to influence overall CAN strategy. 
Direct attempts to influence the COP agenda, such as organizing “side events” (open seminars 
for delegates and observers), making statements at formal sessions or to the international 
press, or engaging in the detailed negotiations on sub-issues such as forestry practices or 
emissions trading rules, was for the most part left to CAN colleagues specializing in the 
UNFCCC process, usually representatives of the international offices of multinational 
organizations such as FoEI, Greenpeace and WWF.  
The general attitude of Norwegian NGO representatives was summed up by the president 
of NU in an interview in advance of COP3 in Kyoto: “When we meet with (...) the Norwegian 
delegation, we don’t really try to persuade them. They have their instructions from the 
Norwegian government. The point is to put as much pressure as possible on the politicians” 
(Tjernshaugen 1997, author’s translation).  
4.2 Shaming 
 
If the Norwegian ENGOs were not trying to influence delegates, what exactly were they up to 
at the COP meetings? First and foremost, the Norwegian climate change activists sought – 
rather successfully – to influence the domestic public’s perception of what was going on in 
the negotiations through their role as sources for the national news media. International 
ENGO representatives in the CAN network backed them in these efforts. The ENGOs’ hope 
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was that this would put pressure on the government to move its policies in the direction they 
favoured.  
During each of the COP meetings, Norwegian newspapers reported the reactions of ENGOs 
to the latest developments, particularly the Norwegian negotiators’ role. During COP3 in 
Kyoto, for instance, NNV alone was referred to as a source by the media more often than the 
Norwegian Confederation of Business and Industry (NHO) – an organization representing 
most of Norway’s private business sector – which was also represented at the meeting. Access 
to the media was one of the main resources of the activists. 
The considerable knowledge gained though participation at the UNFCCC negotiating 
meetings as observers, and especially through participation in the international NGO 
networks, made leading activists very useful for journalists trying to make sense of confusing 
and technically complex negotiations. (As the Norwegian delegations to the UNFCCC 
meetings are well-staffed and experienced, the same resource did not translate equally well 
into access and influence with respect to the delegates.) The environmental organizations’ 
willingness to speak in media-friendly sound bites makes them attractive media sources. They 
also enjoy a high level of trust from the Norwegian population in environmental issues 
(Bortne, Grendstad et al. 2001). Similarities in background and outlook between activists and 
journalists covering the field may also have played a role in this connection.  
Their position as news sources gave the activists some control over an important political 
resource: the public perception of Norway’s role on the international scene, and thus the 
evaluation of the overall environmental performance of the government. The picture the 
environmental activists – Norwegian and foreign alike – painted of Norway was that of a 
petroleum-dependent economy protecting its narrow self-interest and thus endangering the 
prospects for international climate cooperation, as well as its own reputation in the 
international community. This portrayal of Norway as a “climate villain” by 
environmentalists was at times linked to specific issues, such as the plans for gas-fired power 
or increased extraction of petroleum, or the insistence on certain positions in the international 
negotiations. The statements by environmentalists were obviously intended to put pressure on 
the government, to induce it to demonstrate willingness to contribute to climate protection by 
adjusting its negotiating position and domestic policies. Whether or not this strategy was able 
to influence climate change policy decisions, it probably had some bearing on Norwegian 
voters’ perception of the government’s environmental conduct. The hope of the Norwegian 
ENGOs was that this would influence the shifting governments to adjust some policies to 
improve their green image.  
Moral support from the international NGO community gave the Norwegian climate change 
activists increased credibility at home. Both in terms of mobilising for protest, and in terms of 
access to the media, the credibility gained by being seen as national representatives of a 
global environmental movement was important. The Norwegian activists contributed actively 
to pulling international ENGOs into the domestic debate. Throughout the 1990s, Norwegian 
environmentalists would repeatedly solicit statements from allied groups abroad, leading to 
reports in the Norwegian press about international environmental opposition to the 
government’s domestic policies and negotiating position. The episode with the leaked draft 
from 1989 (see above) may have served as inspiration. It is likely that later activities in the 
international arena by Norwegian climate change activists were inspired by the success of this 
appeal to international opinion in grabbing media attention at home, embarrassing authorities 
and thereby influencing the national political agenda. 
During COP1 in Berlin 1995, the Norwegian delegation was, for instance, presented with a 
statement from several international environmental groups criticizing the Norwegian position 
on emission reduction targets and so-called flexibility in the implementation of targets 
(Hjorthol 1995). At the Kyoto conference (COP3) in 1997, representatives of the World 
Council of Churches criticised the position of the Norwegian government led by ordained 
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priest Kjell Magne Bondevik, in line with the environmentalist framing of the debate 
described in the next subsection below. One of the sources of the newspaper article was an 
observer from the Church of Norway who was also a member of the board of FMG (Furuly 
1997). Foreign environmental activists’ characterization of oil-rich Norway as a nation of 
“closet Arabs” was reported in the national press (e.g. Hegtun 1995). Norway has also been 
nominated or selected for the “Fossil of the Day award” presented by CAN organizations 
during the negotiating sessions on several occasions (Fossil of the Day website, CAN 
website).2 
In della Porta and Kriesi’s terms, these are instances of transnational mobilisation of 
support, where a national movement appeals for help from movements abroad (della Porta 
and Kriesi 1998). However, in this case the transnational contacts in question were of a quite 
different character than in della Porta and Kriesi’s example from the struggle against 
apartheid in South Africa. It does not seem that raising the pressure on the Norwegian 
government by influencing the actions of foreign governments (cross-level mobilization) was 
an important strategy for the Norwegian activists; the intended audience for their actions in 
the international arena was mainly the public back home. The support solicited from foreign 
NGOs by Norwegian climate change activists was purely symbolic, in the form of statements, 
with no material resources being provided or withheld by the international allies. The support 
given by members of the international NGO community cost those groups a negligible 
amount of effort, time and money. Apparently the work with joint statements on Norwegian 
policy was carried out by activists from Norwegian organisations. 
On the other hand, one might equally well say that in putting pressure on the Norwegian 
government to accept strict targets, limited flexibility and strict rules in other regards, the 
Norwegian activists acted as local representatives of the international coalition of ENGOs 
cooperating under the CAN umbrella. CAN organizations made similar demands to other 
industrialized governments. The ENGOs’ strategies on the international and domestic arenas 
were in fact closely related. 
4.3 Framing 
Closely related to the shaming activities were activities to strategically frame the domestic 
debate on international commitments and their domestic implementation. While criticizing 
Norway’s negotiating position and the outcomes of negotiations, the Norwegian ENGOs and 
their allies abroad also continuously sought to promote an interpretation of Norway’s existing 
commitments under the UNFCCC, and later under the Kyoto Protocol, that fit their agenda of 
promoting early and substantial emissions reductions at the domestic level. At every turning 
point, including the COP meetings, they have argued that Norway is morally obliged to abide 
by the spirit and intentions of these agreements as well as their formal requirements, and 
highlighted passages that emphasize industrialized countries’ responsibility to reduce 
emissions domestically.  
Key individuals in the CAN network were at least occasionally briefed on domestic issues 
such as gas-fired power by Norwegian activists to ensure that they backed up their colleagues 
when interviewed by national news media. One important contact between the Norwegian and 
the international NGO community was between Greenpeace International and Greenpeace 
Norway. For instance, Bill Hare from Greenpeace International and Kalle Hesstvedt from the 
Norwegian branch co-authored a chapter on “international perspectives” in the “counter-
report” against the Naturkraft project (Klima-alliansen 1996). Bill Hare is the Climate Policy 
Director of Greenpeace International, and the international environmentalist perhaps most 
frequently interviewed by the Norwegian media during international climate change meetings. 
2 see http://www.fossil-of-the-day.org/ or http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco/
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One particularly interesting form of strategic framing deserves closer scrutiny, namely the 
ENGOs’ attempts to exploit their role as news sources to influence domestic expectations 
about the outcome of the negotiations. From 1995, negotiations under the Climate Convention 
had as their explicit goal to define legally binding limits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
from individual countries. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 provided such limits for industrialized 
countries in the years 2008–2012, but left crucial rules for implementation of the 
commitments to be decided at later meetings. The prospect of regulations on GHG emissions 
from 2008 was relevant for a number of domestic actors, including businesses considering 
investment in emission-intensive industries, government agencies considering policies for 
emission reduction, and various interest groups with a stake in the outcome of such policy 
decisions. At the same time, the lingering uncertainty about the exact nature of the 
international regulations and about the measures the government would eventually take to 
implement those commitments, made it difficult to anticipate the consequences.  
In this situation, actors who wanted to influence either domestic investment in emission-
intensive (or emission-reducing) industry and infrastructure, the formation of domestic 
political coalitions around climate-relevant policy decisions, or even public opinion 
concerning such issues, could try to influence the expectations about the emergent climate 
regime held by other actors. This strategy was tried by Norwegian climate change activists 
and their political allies. They repeatedly claimed that the Kyoto Protocol meant grave 
problems for the planned gas-fired power plants: Either the Protocol would simply make the 
plants unprofitable (because implementing the emissions target through CO2 taxes or 
emissions trading would make CO2 emissions costly), or building the plants with the Kyoto 
regime in place would impose extra costs or emissions restrictions on other sectors such as 
road transport.  
The premise for these claims was that the Norwegian economy would have to adapt to an 
absolute ceiling for national emissions, either because further international negotiations would 
lead to a quantitative limit to the use of international emissions trading and the other 
flexibility mechanisms in the Protocol, or because of a decision by Norwegian authorities to 
limit the use of these mechanisms. 
This would, in turn, mean that the domestic allocation of emission rights to firms and 
households would become a zero-sum game, leading to considerable conflicts of interest 
between different sectors of the economy. Allowing one sector to increase emissions would 
imply forcing others to reduce theirs. This would be the case whether emissions were 
regulated through tradable quotas, non-transferable permits, technical standards, or emissions 
taxes. In other words, the expectation of an absolute ceiling on national GHG emissions 
would tend to split emission-intensive sectors in competing camps, and thereby counteract 
political alliances between the potential opponents of the environmental movement.  
During the crucial meeting in Geneva in the summer of 1996 (COP6), the 
environmentalists tended to simply ignore the discussion about flexible implementation. As 
soon as the US delegation had made their historical statement that they supported binding 
emission reduction targets, Norwegian climate change activists were quick to offer their view 
of the consequences. A spokesperson for Greenpeace Norway said there would “probably 
not” be room for emissions from the planned power plants if the American proposition of flat 
percentage cuts was carried out. The president of NU added it would be embarrassing for 
Brundtland if an international treaty forced her to improve a failed environmental policy 
(Bjørkeng 1996; Hjorthol 1996; Dagbladet 1996). The environmentalists dominated the news 
reports after the American announcement, although a spokesman for the Minister of the 
Environment was quoted as questioning their conclusions and pointing to the American 
enthusiasm for emission trading. In the following days, more representatives of the Labour 
government as well as the CEO of Naturkraft referred hopefully to the US support for 
flexibility mechanisms (Bonde 1996; Bull 1996; Stoltenberg 1996). 
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A couple of days after the news from Geneva, an economics professor explicitly presented 
a choice between losing jobs in heavy industry or cancelling the plans for gas-fired power to 
fulfil emission reduction targets in an interview (Engeland 1996b; NTB 1996). During 1997, 
this zero-sum argument (often referring to permanently parking a substantial number of 
private cars to make room for emissions from the power plants) would be used by climate 
change activists as well as by their political allies in the struggle against gas-fired power. It 
was used very actively both by environmental activists and oppositional candidates during the 
campaign for the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1997. After the new minority centrist 
government of gas-power opponents came into office, it became a mainstay of their rhetoric.  
A newspaper report from fall 2000 gives a hint that this strategy at least created some 
uncertainty. Here, the president of NHO and the energy spokesman of the right-wing Progress 
Party say that the gas-fired plants may have to be stopped if the Kyoto rules turn out to be 
very strict in order to avoid placing too heavy burdens on industry and car-owners (Ellingsen 
1997).  
During the Kyoto meeting, the new Liberal Minister of the Environment used every 
opportunity to warn against starting the tough job of complying with the Kyoto Protocol by 
building new gas-fired power plants that would put an increased burden on other sectors. 
Although bitterly disagreeing with the activists on almost all other issues in the negotiations, 
the Minister took over their arguments in this respect. As the Kyoto Protocol did not provide 
exact rules for the use of flexibility mechanisms it left the issue open for interpretation and 
speculation. The FMG used the zero-sum argument again immediately after the Kyoto 
conference. But it was generally politicians that used it with greatest enthusiasm. The three 
parties of the centrist government stuck with it through their fight with the majority in 
parliament, and their eventual loss and resignation.  
Naturkraft and their political allies, on the other hand, envisioned an international climate 
regime where businesses could freely buy emission quotas on the international market.  The 
company itself was active in tree-planting projects in developing countries, with the expressed 
goal of eventually obtaining emission rights under the international climate regime 
(Alstadheim 1997). Labour politicians expressed confidence that it would be possible to buy 
the necessary quotas abroad. With domestic firms operating on international quota markets 
with little restrictions, increased emissions from one domestic activity would not have to be 
offset by corresponding domestic reductions. This would render the zero-sum argument more 
or less invalid. 
It is important to note that the two competing conceptions of the restrictions Norway would 
face under the Kyoto Protocol were each compatible with negotiating positions held by major 
players in the international negotiations. The environmental movement favoured the view also 
championed by the EU and several developing countries that the right to buy quotas from 
abroad should be restricted. The pro-gas coalition favoured the American view that use of the 
mechanisms should be unlimited. Both sides tended to simply assume that their view would 
be the outcome of the negotiations. It is reasonable to interpret this debate at least partly as 
strategic argumentation from both sides. In Putnam’s terms, the activists (just as their 
opponents) tried to use expectations to the outcome of the negotiation phase to influence 
positioning in preliminary rounds of the ratification phase. Again, we are seeing an instance 
of strategic framing (Zald 1996). Any ENGO influence which may have stemmed from such 
a strategy was clearly constrained by the fact that Norwegian media, government and business 
representatives were also present at the meetings and that their organizations thus had 
independent access to information.  
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5 Conclusion: What are green players in two-level games up 
to? 
In concluding, we will briefly recapitulate the findings on ENGO strategies reported above, 
and then point to some implications for the understanding of, first, environmental foreign 
policy and, second, the role of ENGOs in international negotiations. Regarding strategy 
choice, we have seen that ENGOs pursue several different strategies to reach their political 
goals in ongoing international environmental negotiations. Members of the CAN coalition – 
including both nationally-based and multinational environmental groups – to a large degree 
pursued joint goals with regard to the negotiation outcomes and the behaviour of individual 
governments. What linked the joint CAN position papers and “Fossil of the Day” awards at 
the COPs to the ENGO campaigns against gas-fired power plants in Western Norway was a 
goal of making each industrialised country government commit to and implement stringent 
targets for their domestic emissions of greenhouse gases. While lobbying at the international 
conferences was one strategy to promote these goals (particularly pursued by multinational 
groups such as Greenpeace, WWF and FoEI), strategies directed at domestic publics and 
decision makers were also important.  
In the ENGOs’ efforts to change the behaviour of the Norwegian delegation, attempts to 
influence delegates directly through lobbying at the international conferences only played a 
minor part. The ENGOs’ main strategies at these meetings could rather be summed up as 
shaming and framing: Shaming the Norwegian government into changing its policies, and 
framing the domestic debate over international commitments in terms that underpinned their 
own policies. In both these respects, NGO action at the international and domestic levels was 
intimately connected. The Norwegian ENGOs’ activities at the international meetings were 
mostly geared toward influencing the domestic public and thereby, hopefully, the national 
government. In these activities, the activists were advancing viewpoints shared by the wider 
CAN network, and were actively supported by their fellow CAN members.  
For our understanding of environmental foreign policy, the lesson from the above 
discussion is, first, that ENGOs do engage in influencing foreign policy and could potentially 
be one of the actors shaping actual policies. In Norway, ENGO’s opinions strongly influence 
public debate on environmental foreign policy, and it is not unreasonable to assume that this 
could have some bearing on foreign policy decisions. By harshly criticizing Norwegian 
governments, ENGOs tried to make it politically costly to pursue policies they disagreed with. 
As in other countries in North-Western Europe, a Norwegian government’s green credentials 
usually matter to a considerable proportion of the electorate. The shared assessment of the 
Norwegian government by domestic organizations such as NNV, FIVH and NU and 
multinational groups such as Greenpeace and WWF, presumably carried some weight for 
environmentally-minded Norwegians. Our discussion underscores that the resources ENGO 
have at their disposal are mostly symbolic rather than material. When foreign policy relates to 
international environmental agreements, the strategic interpretation and framing of existing or 
proposed international commitments is one available strategy, as well as influencing public 
perceptions of the government’s performance in international arenas. Finally, both domestic 
groups and organizations based abroad could play a role in foreign policy-making, and they 
do sometimes (as in this case) form transnational alliances with the purpose of influencing 
domestic and foreign policy, as well as negotiation outcomes.  
These strategies and their potential impact are unlikely to be limited to the Norwegian case. 
In any country where governments are at least moderately inclined to listen to the 
environmental movement, the influence of ENGOs is likely to be one of the many factors 
determining foreign policy regarding climate change. Generally, governments and public 
opinion in the North-Western part of Europe have been relatively susceptible to arguments 
from environmentalists.  
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The preceding discussion of ENGO strategies also has implications for the understanding 
of their influence in international environmental negotiations, precisely because of the 
ENGOs’ involvement in foreign policy processes. Our case suggests that the assumptions that 
information provided to negotiators is the predominant vehicle of NGO influence, and that 
influence at the international and domestic political levels can be viewed separately are both 
highly problematic. A societal understanding of environmental foreign policy processes is in 
fact crucial to understand NGO influence even in international negotiations (Barkdull and 
Harris 2002). 
In other words, the framework for analysis proposed by Betsill and Corell (2001) would not 
be suitable to assess the overall outcomes of the NGO activities discussed above, and similar 
NGO work directed at the governments of other countries. One “key currency” in the 
Norwegian ENGOs’ dealings was indeed information. The information was, however, rarely 
provided to negotiators. It was rather one of several resources which helped the ENGOs gain 
access to the national news media and other domestic players in their efforts to strategically 
frame the domestic debate on the government’s performance and the content of Norway’s 
international climate policy commitments. In this effort, the Norwegian ENGOs and their 
foreign allies cooperated. The stressing of Norway’s obligation to reduce its domestic 
emissions was a part of CAN’s wider effort to ensure that developed countries did commit to 
reduce their own emissions substantially, instead of relying strongly on so-called flexible 
solutions such as financing emissions reductions abroad or planting trees.  
While information was important, an equally important “currency” for the ENGOs was 
legitimacy, which is the issue at stake in strategies of shaming. The environmental 
movement’s popular credibility in defining who and what is helping the environment is 
perhaps its most important resource, which enables it to dispense and withhold environmental 
credibility to governments, politicians and other actors. In this symbolic sense, grants are 
continually rewarded and threats are made by NGOs during UN environmental negotiations – 
not in terms of money or physical resources, but in terms of governments’ reputation among 
domestic constituencies.  
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